





















The Israeli Case: Lessons from Integrating 
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The paper presents the Israeli government’s response to a 
massive wave of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Un-
ion and Ethiopia between 1989-1992. A country of fewer 
than 5 million accepted almost 400,000 Jewish refugees 
and discouraged granting of political asylum to thousands 
of mostly Muslim refugees from East Africa and prevent-
ed family reunification involving Israeli Arab citizens who 
married Palestinians living outside of Israel (including the 
occupied territories). Various policies designed to provide 
housing and education to the two major immigrant groups 
are analysed. Policies favoured immigrants from the So-
viet Union than the Ethiopians. While the national gov-
ernment and the Jewish Agency controlled immigration 
policy, mayors had some input in implementation. The 
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absorption policies were not coordinated. The key to the 
Israeli success was political will favouring immigration of 
Jews regardless of where they were from. The successful 
absorption of refugees lies in the attitude of the host coun-
try toward immigration. 
Keywords: Israel, Jewish immigrants, absorption policy, 
Russians, Ethiopians, education policy
1. Introduction
This paper examines the Israeli experience of absorbing (integrating) over 
400,000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union and 20,000 Black Af-
rican Jews from Ethiopia between 1989 and 1992. The Israeli government 
and society faced serious challenges in absorbing these diverse immigrant 
groups. Was this nation of fewer than five million persons, capable of suc-
cessfully absorbing so many immigrants? 
Defined as a Jewish state, Israel and Israeli leaders wanted Jewish im-
migrants.1 From independence in 1948 to the present they sought to in-
crease a Jewish majority; they feared a growing non-Jewish population. 
Thus, Jewish identity is a crucial issue for new immigrants. Not being Jew-
ish for potential immigrants/refugees can mean exclusion and rejection 
by the Israeli government.2 For example, since 2003, Israeli law prevents 
residents of the occupied territories who marry Israeli Arabs from living in 
Israel.3 The government also discouraged the granting of asylum to mostly 
Muslim refugees from East Africa.4
1 The Law of Return (1950), grants Jews and their descendants free entry to the 
country and automatic citizenship. The law’s liberal character reflected the desire by Israeli 
leaders to facilitate the mass immigration of Jews. 
2 For Soviet Jews the issue of their Jewish identity was on an individual basis. An 
estimated 1/3 of the Soviet Jewish immigrants were not Jews according to Halacha (Jewish 
Law) – born to a Jewish mother or to a woman who converted to Judaism. The issue of Jew-
ish identity for Ethiopians concerned the entire community.
3 http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/191711/knesset-extends-law-forbidding-palestini-
ans-married-to-israelis-from-living-in-jewish-state (last visited June 9, 2017). 
4 In 1977, Prime Minister Menachem Begin authorized citizenship for 66 Vietnam-
ese refugees travelling on an Israeli ship (https://972mag.com/i-remember-when-israel-res-
cued-non-jewish-refugees/55387/)
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An important question concerns the relevance of the Israeli experience of 
absorbing Russian and Ethiopian immigrants for the EU and member na-
tions dealing with the massive immigrant/refugee following the civil war in 
Syria. Furthermore, there is the question of ‘what can mayors in Europe 
learn from the Israeli experience’?
2.  The Absorption of Russian and Ethiopian 
Immigrants 1989-1992
In the early 1950s, Israel transferred responsibility for immigrant absorp-
tion to the Jewish Agency, an NGO representing world Jewry.5 Symboli-
cally, world Jewry became responsible for Israel’s immigrant absorption. 
Formally, the role of the government became minor.
Massive waves of immigrants drove national and economic development 
as new immigrants doubled the population by 1952 and tripled it by 1960. 
Following independence, fearing a concentration of its Jewish population 
in the coastal strip, the government pursued a policy of population disper-
sal which sent new immigrants to “development” or “new” towns in thinly 
populated peripheral areas. Several of the new towns were located in areas 
along the border with Israeli Arabs. During the 1950s, the Jewish Agency 
resettled immigrants directly into new, furnished housing in development 
towns and rural cooperatives (moshavim). Immigrants of means settled 
themselves in the major cities (Aharoni, 1991, p. 116).
A pattern of ethnic concentration and separation developed among the 
Jews of Israel. Almost 90 per cent of veteran Jewish Israelis were Ashke-
nazi (European) and their descendants. They were concentrated in areas 
in the larger cities or in kibbutzim, moshavim, and small towns. A small 
number of veteran Sephardim resided in the larger cities. Many post 1948 
European Jewish immigrants settled in maabarot (transit camps), cities, 
and towns all in central Israel.6 Jews from Arab lands (Oriental or Sephar-
dim) arriving after 1948 became most of the inhabitants in new or devel-
5 Founded in 1929 under the League of Nations Mandate the Jewish Agency sought 
to establish an independent state for the Jewish People in the British Mandate of Palestine. 
The Agency represented the Jewish community in the British Mandate and Jews in the Di-
aspora. Its funding came from Diaspora communities. Since independence, the Agency has 
existed as an international organization. 
6 The Jewish Agency provided relatively expensive subsidised housing in the centre 
of the country for Polish Jews who arrived after 1956 (Stock, 1988, pp. 128-129). Over the 
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opment towns in the periphery. Others settled in peripheral moshavim and 
in transit camps in Israel’s centre which developed into neighbourhoods 
in cities or towns. 
Despite the relatively small size of the country, residents of the develop-
ment towns did not have access to jobs in the centre where most econom-
ic development occurred (Sharkansky, 1997, p. 7). Moreover, the level of 
educational, social, and health services in the new towns became second- 
and third-rate in comparison to those in central Israel.
3. The Ministry of Absorption
The government established a Ministry of Absorption in 1968 after it 
failed to convince volunteers in the 1967 Six Days War to remain and 
become Israeli citizens. The government proposed that the Jewish Agen-
cy transfer its absorption functions to the new ministry. The head of the 
agency’s absorption department, a member of the labour party, refused. It 
won the Prime Minister’s approval to retain its absorption responsibilities 
(Stock, 1988).7 The Jewish Agency continued to bring immigrants to the 
country and absorb them for the first year. Thereafter, the new ministry 
tried to coordinate immigrant services provided by other ministries. 
4.  The Experience of Soviet Jewish Immigrants
After WWII, the USSR had the world’s second largest Jewish communi-
ty.8 Soviet Jews were diverse. In the western (European) areas were most-
ly Ashkenazi Jews. Many were well educated, highly skilled and integrated 
into Soviet society. In the eastern Islamic Republics were mostly non-Eu-
ropean Jews, who resembled the Jews of Iraq and Kurdistan. Some Ashke-
nazi “Russian” Jews whose families migrated during the Soviet regime also 
lived in the Soviet Islamic Republics. The Jews of the East remained more 
traditional, less assimilated, and much less western in orientation. Also in 
years most of the European Jews in development towns left to join relatives and friends in 
central Israel.
7 The United States tax laws also influenced this decision.
8 By 1988, its Jewish population stood third behind that of the US and Israel.
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the southern central Soviet Union, there was the traditional Jewish com-
munity of the Republic of Georgia. 
Following the Communist Revolution Jewish emigration almost stopped 
completely. After an initial fertile cultural period for Jews, Stalin pursued 
a policy of cultural genocide, executing thousands of Jewish writers, poets, 
Rabbis, and teachers. During WWII, German soldiers murdered two mil-
lion Jewish civilians in the Baltic States, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia.9 
During WWII Stalin used “Jewish identity” to encourage support at home 
and abroad for the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany. After the war, 
policies of suppressing Jewish culture and identity and purges resumed. 
In 1948, the USSR recognized Israel and both countries established dip-
lomatic relations. When Israeli minister, Golda Meir went to New Year 
(Rosh Hashona) services at a synagogue in Moscow, she caused a near 
riot. Tens of thousands of Jews cheered and greeted her on the streets. 
This spontaneous public outburst challenged a broadly held assumption 
that Soviet Jews had lost their Jewish identity and assimilated.10
The 1953 “doctor’s plot” led some to expect increased persecution and 
massive deportations. Stalin’s death on March 5th, 1953 stabilised the sit-
uation. Thereafter, the regime suppressed Jewish life, culture, religion and 
almost any form of social/political organization. In Georgia and the east-
ern Muslim republics, Jewish religious practices survived.
In the early 1950s, the Israeli government established the Liaison Bureau 
in the Prime Minister’s Office to encourage the immigration of Soviet 
Jews to Israel. Initially its agents fostered Jewish culture and identity 
among Soviet Jews.11
The USSR broke diplomatic relations with Israel after the June 1967 
Six Days War. The War inspired a Jewish nationalist/Zionist resurgence 
amongst Soviet Jews. A small but considerable number filed requests to 
leave for Israel. Later some Jewish activists were arrested and sent to pris-
on. They became known as the Prisoners of Zion. 
9 After the German/Soviet occupation of Poland in 1939, Stalin deported several 
hundred thousand Polish and Baltic Jews into the Soviet Union
10 Many Soviet Jews whose families lived outside the Soviet Union (Poland, Romania 
and the Baltic States) until 1939 often preserved their Jewish identity (Gitelman, 1997).
11 They worked from the Israeli Embassy in Moscow until 1967. Israel beamed radio 
broadcasts to the Soviet Union.
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In the 1970s, the Soviet government allowed over 200,000 Jews to leave 
on visas for Israel.12 In the absence of direct flights, most went to Israel via 
Vienna. Beginning in 1975 many “dropped out” in hopes of resettling in 
the United States and elsewhere. At the time, the Soviet government only 
allowed Soviet Jews to apply for visas to Israel. In the aftermath of the 
Western reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union 
halted emigration of Soviet Jews in 1982.
The Jewish Agency absorption department resettled most Soviet Jewish im-
migrants arriving between 1967 and 1982 in absorption centres all over the 
country. They placed many in furnished units in new apartment buildings. 
Adult immigrants studied Hebrew and children went to school. The govern-
ment supplied immigrants with various economic benefits and subsidised the 
purchase of appliances and automobiles at less than half the Israeli market 
price. Many Soviet immigrants utilised large mortgages to purchase apart-
ments throughout Israel. Fear that the Soviet immigrants might leave and go 
to the United States motivated the provision of many of the benefits. 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. He soon realised that the 
United States Government required free emigration of Soviet Jews as a 
condition for détente. By 1987, the Soviet Union began to allow free emi-
gration for Soviet Jews. At the time almost 95 per cent of those wanting to 
emigrate preferred to resettle in the United States. However, the Ameri-
can and Israeli governments and leaders of the American Jewish commu-
nity opposed the resettlement of several hundred thousand or more Soviet 
Jews in the United States. In negotiations involving the White House, 
Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service and mem-
bers of Congress (with consultations with American Jewish leaders, Israel 
and the Soviet Union) limited the annual refugee entry from the Soviet 
Union to 50,000; Soviet Jews would receive up to 40,000 of these visas. 
All refugee visas would be given in Moscow. 
The new quota of 40,000 created a dilemma for the almost one million Soviet 
Jews that wanted to leave. Most decided to go to Israel rather than wait for 
years for an American visa and the future re-closing of the gates of the Soviet 
Union. The prospect of waiting for years, and the risk that Soviet authorities 
might close the gates, led the overwhelming majority to leave for Israel.
The expected massive wave of immigration in 1988, led the Israeli gov-
ernment to pursue “direct absorption” which privatised the absorption 
process. It did not use absorption centres. After a short stay at a hotel or 
12 A desire to score points with the US and West Germany may have influenced the 
Soviet decision to let both Jews and Germans emigrate in the 1970s.
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with relatives, the immigrant receives resources to rent private housing 
and to be self-sufficient for a year. The immigrant then gets a job or joins a 
subsidised job-training program. The Jewish Agency continued to absorb 
some Soviet immigrants (mostly elderly, handicapped, and single parent 
families) in absorption centres.
Several reasons explain the change in policy. The Jewish Agency had be-
gun to leave the field of absorption. Its overseas funders did not want to 
get involved in the large project. Second, the existing absorption centres 
could not cope with the size of the immigration. Finally, many Soviet 
Jews may have preferred the innovative approach and authorities wanted 
to please them. Some could leave and most would soon be able to vote.13 
The policy had mixed results; two and three families often shared a single 
apartment. Others found cheaper housing in peripheral areas or in slum 
neighbourhoods with poor schools, public services and few jobs. Unem-
ployment was rampant and TV reported on PhDs, classical musicians and 
soccer coaches sweeping streets. In a 1996 interview about the massive 
Soviet immigration (1989-1992) former Prime Minister Shamir suggested 
that the government had no policy to absorb them. We realised, he ar-
gued, that once they arrived then solutions were found. He thought that 
idea of preparing ahead of time to be anachronistic.14 Within a decade, 
most Soviet Jews found permanent housing and employment. 
5.  The Ethiopians
Prior to 1977, only 100 Ethiopian Jews “had been grudgingly allowed… 
(to immigrate) … by either Ethiopian or Israeli authorities” (Kaplan & 
Rosen, 1994). Previously, government leaders (of the Labour party) op-
posed their immigration. Also, Orthodox Jewish religious and political 
groups argued that the Ethiopians were not authentic Jews. In 1973, the 
Sephardi Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef recognized them as descendants of 
the Tribe of Dan and eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return.15 
13 Discontent by new Soviet voters contributed to the 1992 defeat of Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir and the Likud. By 1999, Jews from the former Soviet Union became Israel’s 
largest Jewish minority and a very effective political lobby.
14 Interview with Yitzhak Shamir, July 17, 1996.
15 Wagaw, 1993, p. 57. He ruled that they must undergo “strict conversion proce-
dures” for marriage.
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While the Israeli government began to foster their immigration after 1977, 
the issue of the legitimacy of their Jewish identity remained.16 
Following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 and up to 1984, almost 
6,500 Ethiopian Jews immigrated to Israel (Szulc, 1991, p. 292). A cov-
ert airlift Operation Moses brought another 8, 000 Ethiopians by way of 
Sudan between November 1984 and June 1985 (New York Times (NYT) 
2 November 1990). In Operation Solomon, the Israeli Air Force brought 
14,160 Ethiopian Jews from Addis Ababa to Israel in a 36-hour period 
in May 1991 (Kaplan & Rosen, 1994, p. 65ff).17 By 1992, almost 50,000 
Ethiopian immigrants lived in the country.
The Jewish Agency handled their absorption during their first year in Isra-
el. Thereafter, the Ministry of Absorption and the government took over. 
The Jewish Agency placed new arrivals in absorption centres. When these 
filled in the late 1980s, it placed them temporarily in hotels and caravan 
sites along with Russian immigrants. 
Ethiopian immigrants became dependent on the Jewish Agency for shel-
ter, food, health care, and income. Their absorption resembled the pa-
ternalism experienced by Moroccan Jewish immigrants in the 1950s. For 
example, unlike fellow immigrants from the Soviet Union, they could nei-
ther participate in direct absorption nor send their children to a school 
system of their own choice.
Absorption authorities claimed that the Ethiopians could not be absorbed 
directly because of their low levels of education, skills, and resources and 
appropriate culture to obtain housing on their own. Not mentioned were 
the vested interests of the Jewish Agency, Diaspora agencies and the gov-
ernment in keeping the Ethiopians under their care and control. First, 
if the Ethiopians participated in “direct absorption”, the Jewish Agency 
and the political parties that controlled it risked losing tens of millions of 
dollars received from the US government and Diaspora Jewry. This also 
served overseas fundraisers: “They could be displayed as a unique and 
exotic group; black, Jewish and poor” (Hertzog, 1995). Most importantly, 
care for Ethiopians justified the Agency’s continued role in absorption 
16 Until about 1985, Israel denied Ethiopian immigrants citizenship and registration 
as Jews unless they converted. Until today, many private Jewish religious schools only accept 
Ethiopian pupils that have undergone formal conversion. In response to protests by Ethio-
pian activists, the Jewish Orthodox religious establishment has shown a degree of flexibility 
(Kaplan & Rosen, 1994, p. 74 ff).
17 The pandemonium and excitement of the crowds at the Israeli airport reminded 
many of the joy at the homecoming of rescued hostages of Entebbe in 1976. 
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despite a commitment to transfer of its absorption responsibilities and 
facilities.18 Finally, The Jewish Agency funded 100 per cent of absorption 
centres with overseas moneys. In contrast, direct absorption required the 
government fund 50 per cent of the cost.  
We now turn to issues of permanent housing and education involved in 
the absorption of Ethiopian Jews. The two are intertwined as where people 
lived often determined the quality of education that their children received.
6.  Housing for Ethiopians
The Absorption Ministry had responsibility for providing permanent 
housing for Ethiopians with resources provided by the Israeli government 
and Jewish Agency. The government urged the purchase of apartments in 
communities with “strong infrastructures” more in the centre than the pe-
riphery. They hoped to integrate Ethiopian immigrants within Israeli soci-
ety in groups whose size enabled observance of community life while not 
creating “congregational pockets”. Despite these policy objectives “… the 
economic realities of the country continued to favour the ‘ghettoization’ 
of the immigrants in poorer neighbourhoods” (Wagaw, 1993, p. 138).19
Most available vacant public housing and private units existed in devel-
opment towns and poorer neighbourhoods in the centre of the country. 
Many of the units occupied housing Ethiopian immigrants were located 
often in the same neighbourhood, street or building.20 In many of these 
same neighbourhoods, the authorities turned temporary absorption cen-
tres into permanent public housing, which created instant mini-ghettos of 
Ethiopians. Later arrivals followed their relatives and friends to these poor-
er environments despite the urging by officials to seek housing elsewhere. 
Costs of existing apartments and construction of new housing in “better” 
areas in central Israel were prohibitive (Lazin, 1997). Finally, the initial 
mortgage policy failed. Very few Ethiopian families obtained mortgages 
18 In the late 1980s the Jewish Agency agreed again to transfer its absorption func-
tions and facilities to the government. 
19 Emphasis added (Ministry of Absorption “The Ethiopian Immigrants: Report of 
Their Situation and an operative plan to establish their absorption in February 1987,” 9 
February 1987 and Memo, Aryeh Barr to Ariel Sharon, 16 June 1991).
20 Ministry of Absorption regulations urged the placement of a maximum of three 
Ethiopian families per apartment building entrance.
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before 1991. Importantly, the largest mortgages did not provide sufficient 
funding to allow the recipient to buy a unit in a decent neighbourhood in 
central Israel. Consequently, most Ethiopians found permanent housing 
in peripheral development towns and in poorer neighbourhoods of less 
well to do cities and towns in central Israel. These communities had fewer 
economic opportunities, and problematic educational systems. 
7.  Education: Ethiopians
While some Israeli leaders and educators wanted to provide Ethiopians 
with educational opportunities, government officials were most concerned 
about their religious needs. Minister of Education and head of the Na-
tional Religious Party, Zevulon Hammer favoured a religious education 
for all Ethiopian Jews who had been isolated from Rabbinical Judaism 
for centuries.21 In the early 1980s, Hammer required Ethiopian pupils to 
attend state religious schools during their first year in Israel. This policy 
prevented them from exercising their legal right to choose either the state 
secular or religious system (Schwartzwald, 1984, p. 105).22
Importantly, even if most Ethiopian parents had no idea of the differences 
in the school systems, many may have preferred that their children attend 
religious schools (Gdor, 1996, p. 28), but they had no choice in the matter.
Upon arrival in Israel, many Ethiopian children had little or no formal 
schooling. A large number could neither read nor write in any language and 
initially knew little Hebrew. They also had minimum support from very poor 
21 No similar policy was deemed necessary for the assimilated Soviet Jewish immi-
grants who had lived under Communism for several generations. The Labour Party sup-
ported Hammer’s decision hoping to avoid the absorption “errors” made in the 1950s that 
forced religious Jews to send their children to secular schools (Zameret, 1992). Some viewed 
religious schools as being less threatening, more supportive and contributing to their accept-
ance as Jews. 
22 The educational reforms of the early 1950s created two public school systems, 
state secular and state religious. Pedagogy in the latter is controlled by the National Reli-
gious party. There are also recognized schools operated by the ultra-Orthodox. Arab pupils 
have a separate school system which is part of the state secular system. 
Hammer’s decision increased resources for his party’s state religious school system. 
Moreover, the parents of the pupils provided potential voters for his party. Officials of the 
state religious system saw educating Ethiopian children as a spiritual and national challenge. 
The influx of Ethiopian pupils in 1991 overloaded the religious school system and led to 
“white flight”. While claiming to understand and respect the traditions of the Ethiopian 
pupils, religious educators wanted the immigrants to adopt “… mannerism, language, tradi-
tions, cultural mores and values of the host society” (Eisikovits & Beck, 1990, p.178). 
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parents who did not know the language, curriculum or host culture (Wagaw, 
1993, p. 28ff.; JDC, February 1997; Youth Aliyah, 1995, p. 8, 22).23
The educational level of the state religious school system and professional 
training of its pedagogical staff is less that of its secular system. It has fewer 
schools and pupils. 24 It has more than twice the percentage of low perform-
ing and problem pupils who are two thirds of the student body (Schwart-
zwald, 1984, p. 102). Also, the quality of schools varies significantly from 
place to place. The level of teaching, resources, and pupil performance is 
much higher in central Israel, especially in the more well-to-do areas (Iram 
& Schmida, 1988, pp. 37-42). 
In general, the placement of Ethiopians in peripheral towns and in poorer 
communities in central Israel resulted in most Ethiopian children being as-
signed to schools serving low income and disadvantaged Jewish Israeli pu-
pils. Rather than spread the Ethiopian pupils out, schools in the larger secu-
lar system were excluded (Kaplan & Salamon, 1998, p. 3). Moreover, some 
municipalities refused to assign Ethiopian pupils to study at the “stronger” 
or “better” state religious schools and concentrated them in their weaker 
schools.25 In many cases, schools accepting Ethiopian pupils assigned them 
to special preparatory classes for the first year, in accordance with Ministry 
guidelines. Here they remained for several years. Often, teachers in these 
classes were poorly trained, part-time, and lacked certification (State Comp-
troller 1985, p.700). Finally, several municipal school systems assigned 
many normal Ethiopian pupils in special-education classes, “the educational 
equivalent of a death sentence” (Gdor, 1996, p. 31).
Operation Solomon in May 1991 almost tripled the number of Ethiopian 
pupils overnight. State religious schools in the periphery and in poor neigh-
bourhoods of central Israel absorbed most of them. Many schools became 
more than 60-70 per cent Ethiopian.26 Finally, the entire educational sys-
23 Most Ethiopian immigrants “came from one of the most conservative, rural regions 
of Ethiopia ..., illiteracy among the adult population was more than 90 per cent …” (Wagaw, 
1993, pp. 26-28). Also, between 25 and 38 per cent, compared to 9 per cent for Israeli fam-
ilies, were single parent families (Ibid, 1993, p.74).
24 From the mid-1980s until the late 1990 between 15 to 20 per cent of Israeli Jewish 
pupils attend the state religious system, 68 to 75 per cent in the state secular and 5 to 10 
per cent in the recognized private religious schools (Wagaw, 1993, p. 131; Israel Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 117).
25 This probably reflected concern with “white flight” (Halevi, 1996, p.19).
26 In 1996-97 at least 60 schools had more than 25 per cent Ethiopian pupils; in 1997 
18 schools had above 40 per cent (Algazy, 1998; Kaplan & Salamon, 1998; Gdor, 1996, p. 28). 
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tem and state religious schools suffered from a lack of planning, prepara-
tion, space, and resources to absorb both Russian and Ethiopian immi-
grant pupils.27
The poverty of most Ethiopian families exacerbated this situation. While 
public education is free, parents must purchase books and supplies. Up-
wards of 40 per cent of families may have lacked funds for books (Sever, 
1997, p. 519). Placing students with poor educational backgrounds and 
weak family situations into weak schools with weak pupils resulted in 
minimal learning experiences (Gdor, 1996, pp.28-31; Wagaw, 1993, p. 
144ff).28 
If education is the key to success for any group, it is the more so for the 
Ethiopians. It affects their chances for upward mobility and plays a crucial 
role in their integration into Israel’s mainstream-modern, technological 
and mostly urban society (JDC, 1997).
8.  Local level activity – the role of a mayor
In general, the government and Jewish Agency made absorption policy at 
the national level. Mayors had minimal input. In housing, many mayors ob-
jected to the placement of temporary housing camps consisting of caravans 
(“mobile homes”) in their communities. These were intended for new im-
migrants from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Powerful mayors kept them 
out of their municipalities and others had them placed on the outskirts and 
provided a minimum of services. 
The mayor of Beer-Sheva in the peripheral South pressured for and received 
a maximum number of Soviet immigrants. He believed that government 
funding and resources would follow.
In 1991, the Israeli government set up a temporary immigrant housing 
“encampment” called Nachal Bekka on the southern edge of the City of 
Beer-Sheva. This community of 2,500 units soon housed 1,613 Soviet and 
302 Ethiopian families. It included three hundred units for Ben Gurion 
27 Protocol of Ministerial Committee for Immigration, 14 July 1991. 
28 After June 1992, the newly elected Rabin government let Ethiopian pupils attend 
state secular schools. (JP 18 June 1991). In 1993, approximately 95 per cent of Ethiopian 
pupils were in the State religious’ schools. The percentage dropped to 85 per cent in 1995 
and 76 per cent in 1996 (Jerusalem Post 18 June 1991).
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University students, who performed community service. Their housing 
may have served as buffers between the Russians and Ethiopians. 
Each 45-square meter unit was divided into two apartments, each with a 
kitchenette, toilet, shower, bedroom, sitting room, running water and elec-
tricity. Public transportation, a subsidized coin operated laundry, grocery 
stores, kindergartens and public phones served the community. Within a 
year or two, a few of the residents from the former Soviet Union had pur-
chased automobiles and many had installed telephones, washing machines, 
and air conditioners. At the far end, two small buildings served as kindergar-
ten facilities; one for religious and the other for secular pupils respectively. 
Immigrant children from the former Soviet Union occupied one and Ethi-
opian immigrant children the other. In commenting to an American visitor, 
a Ben Gurion University professor explained: “One is ‘black’, one is ‘white’; 
but it’s not like in the United States. It’s more complex. A combination of 
race, religion and politics explains the separation in educational institutions.” 
9.  Findings
The findings here show that for most immigrants from the former Sovi-
et Union arriving after 1988, Israeli policy departed from traditional ab-
sorption practices. A new policy of “direct absorption” provided subsidies 
to immigrants for housing, living allowances, job search assistance, and 
vouchers for Hebrew classes and job training. This group had considera-
ble human capital; many were university graduates, engineers, and doc-
tors. Using the resources provided by “direct absorption”, many adapted 
well to the new society.
The Jewish Agency used the traditional absorption system to provide per-
manent housing, health care, and pensions for a minority of Soviet immi-
grants including many elderly, single parent families, the infirm and poor.
The actual and potential political clout of Russian immigrants made the 
system more responsive to their needs. Jewish Agency and Israeli govern-
ment officials realised that some, unlike most Ethiopians, had the option 
of going elsewhere.
The Jewish Agency and government housed Ethiopians in poor neigh-
bourhoods in the periphery and in central Israel. The other options were 
economically unfeasible. The government placed Ethiopian children, 
most of them with weak educational skills, in the second-rate religious 
school system. Political party interests determined this policy. There was 
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little political pressure to act otherwise. The Ethiopians had little if any 
clout.29 They were more of a captive group. 
10. Conclusions
In asking about the relevance of this case study for EU’s refugee crisis, it 
is important to understand that the Israeli government pursued a policy 
of maximum immigration of Jewish refugees. While they preferred Jews 
from the Soviet Union, they also accepted Ethiopian Jews. Motivating 
Israeli political leaders was a perception that a loss of a Jewish majority 
posed an existential threat to Israel’s survival. 
The pre-state Zionist ideology envisioned an independent “Jewish” state 
in part of Palestine with Jews being an overwhelming majority of the citi-
zenry. During the Holocaust, millions of potential citizens were killed. At 
statehood in 1948, the Jewish state had an Arab population of about 18 per 
cent. Their higher birth rate threatened the Jewish majority in the long run. 
Leaders of Israel welcomed the Jews from Arab lands whom they looked 
down upon as being primitive, less educated, and very different from the 
Jews of Europe, but they accepted them to preserve the Jewish majority and 
achieve a critical population mass needed for economic survival. 
From the early 1950s Israeli leaders looked for a potential mass immigra-
tion of educated, “cultured” (and “Western”) Jews. They focused on the 
almost three million Jews in the Soviet Union. The government estab-
lished the Liaison Bureau to bring the Soviet Jews to Israel. The Liaison 
Bureau organised Jews and non-Jews in the US to pressure the American 
government to influence the Soviets to let the Jews go.30 When the gates 
opened in 1989, Israel pressured the US to close its gates to Soviet Jews. 
The Ethiopians faced a similar second or third-class status of immigrant 
Jews from Arab lands. They were needed and thus accepted, but reluc-
tantly. They did not receive the same opportunities and benefits as many 
of the Soviet Jews. 
The flip side of the demographic concern is the reluctance of Israel to 
accept the return of the Palestinians. A recent law prevents Israeli Arab 
29 By the early 1990s the Ethiopian Jewish community in Israel barely numbered 
70,000 persons. 
30 It also pressured European governments not to accept Soviet Jews who had left 
Israel.
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citizens from bringing spouses from the occupied territories to live in Is-
rael. Israel has also been reluctant to grant asylum to non-Jewish political 
refugees from East Africa.
The political will to accept and absorb Jewish refugees apparently buff-
ered the lack of a coordinated absorption policy. The Prime Minister did 
not see the need to plan for the arrival of a massive wave of immigrants. 
His view was ‘let them come and we will find solutions.’ In the end, that 
is what happened.
In the case of the current crisis in Europe, acceptance of immigrants 
would be facilitated if any member of EU sought to expand its popula-
tion. Countries that are short of work force might be interested in accept-
ing more refugees. Moreover, refugees arriving with skills and professions 
might be more easily accepted. Finally, some countries might be more 
willing to accept Christian refugees. 
In the case of Israel, not all mayors favoured the policy of wanting a maxi-
mum of Soviet Jews. Some wanted to keep Ethiopians out. With the massive 
wave of immigrants, the government built temporary caravan communities 
to house them. Some municipalities objected to a caravan community be-
ing placed in their city or town: NIMBY. When these efforts failed, some 
mayors placed them on the edge of the municipality and did not provide 
services. In sharp contrast, the mayor of Beer-Sheva wanted a maximum 
number of Soviet immigrants. He believed that they would help develop the 
city. He expected that the government, Jewish Agency and Diaspora Jewry 
would provide resources to facilitate the absorption of the immigrants. 
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LESSONS FROM THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE WITH IMMIGRANTS 
FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ETHIOPIA, 1989–1992
Summary
The paper presents an account of the Israeli government’s efforts to absorb and 
integrate an influx of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. 
With fewer than five million persons, Israel accepted 400,000 Jewish refugees 
between 1989–1992. At the time, the Israeli government discouraged granting 
of political asylum to tens of thousands of mostly Muslim refugees from East Af-
rica. Furthermore, an Israeli law prevented family reunification of Israeli Arab 
citizens who married Palestinians living outside of Israel (including the occupied 
territories). The paper looks at policies designed to provide housing and educa-
tion to the Russian and Ethiopian immigrants. Israeli absorption policies were 
not coordinated. Prime Minister Shamir later told the author “Who needed poli-
cy? Let them come and we will make policy.” Policies gave preferential treatment 
to Russian immigrants who had more clout than the Ethiopians. They also had 
greater social capital. While the national government and the Jewish Agency, 
an NGO representing world Jewry, set immigration policy, mayors had some 
input in implementation. One mayor discussed here used absorption of immi-
grants as a means to foster local economic growth and development. The major 
finding here is the importance of “political will”. Israeli government officials and 
much of the Israeli population favoured mass immigration of Jews regardless of 
where they were from. Israeli leaders want to preserve a Jewish majority among its 
citizens. With respect to lessons for the EU, the findings here suggest that the suc-
cessful absorption and acceptance of refugees lies in the attitude of the host country 
toward immigration. Policies and issues of coordination and implementation are 
secondary concerns. In the Israeli case despite the lack of adequate resources and 
lack of coordination absorption of immigrants succeeded.
Key words: Israel; Jewish immigrants; absorption policy; Russians; Ethiopians; 
education policy
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POUKE IZ  IZRAELSKOG ISKUSTVA S DOSELJENICIMA IZ 
SOVJETSKOG SAVEZA I ETIOPIJE 1989. – 1992.
Sažetak
U radu se analiziraju nastojanja izraelske vlade da apsorbira i integrira židov-
ske doseljenike iz Sovjetskog Saveza i Etiopije. U doba kad je imao manje od 5 
milijuna stanovnika, Izrael je prihvatio 400.000 židovskih izbjeglica u razdo-
blju od 1989. do 1992. Istovremeno je izraelska vlada nastojala osujetiti dava-
nje političkog azila desecima tisuća pretežno muslimanskih izbjeglica iz istočne 
Afrike. Jednim od zakona spriječeno je spajanje obitelji izraelskih državljana 
arapskog podrijetla vjenčanim s Palestincima/kama koji žive izvan Izraela (uk-
ljučujući i okupirana područja). Rad se bavi javnim politikama kreiranima da 
bi se ruskim i etiopskim doseljenicima omogućio smještaj i obrazovanje. Izrael-
ske apsorpcijske javne politike nisu bili usklađene. Premijer Shamir kasnije je 
autoru rada izjavio „Kome trebaju javne politike?Neka oni samo dođu, onda 
ćemo kreirati politike.“ Javne su politike favorizirale ruske doseljenike koji su 
imali veću utjecaj i veći društveni kapital od Etiopljana. Središnja vlast i Ži-
dovska agencija, nevladina organizacija koja predstavlja Židove u svijetu, odre-
đivale su doseljeničku politiku, dok su pojedini gradonačelnici imali određeni 
utjecaj tijekom njezine primjene. Jedan od gradonačelnika spomenutih u radu 
iskoristio je integraciju doseljenika kao sredstvo poboljšanja gospodarskog rasta 
i razvoja svoje lokalne jedinice. Najvažniji nalaz rada jest važnost „političke 
volje“. Dužnosnici izraelske vlade i mnogobrojni građani Izraela podržavali su 
masovno doseljavanje Židova bez obzira na to iz koje su zemlje dolazili. Izrael-
ski vođe žele očuvati židovsku većinu među svojim građanima. Rad pokazuje da 
Europska unija iz izraelskog iskustva može naučiti kako uspješna integracija 
i prihvaćanje izbjeglica ovisi o stavu zemlje domaćina prema imigraciji. Javne 
politike i problemi koordinacije i implementacije od drugorazredne su važnosti. 
U izraelskom slučaju, unatoč manjku odgovarajućih sredstava i nedostatku ko-
ordinacije, integracija doseljenika pokazala se uspješnom.
Ključne riječi: Izrael; židovski doseljenici iz Sovjetskog Saveza i Etiopije; ap-
sorpcijska politika; obrazovna politika
